yYAXssKCQaUWZcXZ79RJTBLvo-c;SfREtjZ9NYeQnnVMC-CsZ9qN6L0 Finance, Economics, Globus, Brokers, Banks, Collateral-Oriano Mattei: 2010

video

Loading...

venerdì 31 dicembre 2010

Oriano Mattei : IL PRESIDENTE LULA DICE NO ALL'ESTRADIZIONE DI CESARE BATTISTI.LA FARNESINA RICHIAMA AMBASCIATORE.

31 Dicembre 2010


BRASILIA - Il Governo brasiliano considera ''impertinente in particolare nel riferimento personale a Lula'' la nota diffusa ieri dal Governo italiano circa il caso Battisti. Lo ha sottolineato il ministro degli esteri brasiliano, Celso Amorim, leggendo una nota ufficiale del governo brasiliano che annuancia il no ufficiale all'estradizione di Battisti.

Amorim ha aggiunto di non ritenere che il presidente Lula si mettera' in contatto con le autorita' italiane. A una domanda se considera che le decisioni di Brasilia su Battisti possano pregiudicare i rapporti con l' Italia, Amorim ha risposto ''non credo''. Amorim ha incontrato la stampa leggendo la nota del governo nella sede della presidenza della Repubblica.Il ministro degli Esteri brasiliano Celso Amorim ha detto di non ritenere che il presidente Lula si metterà in contatto con le autorità italiane. A una domanda se considera che le decisioni di Brasilia su Battisti possano pregiudicare i rapporti con l' Italia, Amorim ha risposto "non credo". Amorim ha incontrato la stampa leggendo la nota del governo nella sede della presidenza della Repubblica.

RESTERA' COME IMMIGRANTE E NON COME RIFUGIATO - Cesare Battisti resterà in Brasile come immigrante, non come rifugiato o come esiliato politico. E al Supremo Tribunale Federale non spetta più prendere decisioni sul caso ma solo emettere il documento di scarcerazione. Lo ha riferito oggi un portavoce del governo a Brasilia citato dalla stampa brasiliana. "Spetterà ora al Stf emettere l'ordine di scarcerazione di Battisti, detenuto nel penitenziario della Papuda a Brasilia", ha detto ancora la fonte. "La decisione del Supremo può essere monocratica, firmata dal suo presidente Cezar Peluso, o del plenario. Se Peluso opta per la riunione del plenario, la liberazione avrà luogo solo in febbraio, perche il Stf adesso é in pausa estiva. Ma la decisione monocratica invece può essere firmata in qualsiasi momento". Dal momento che il Supremo Tribunale Federale ha invertito all'inizio del 2009 la sentenza di rifugiato emessa dall'allora ministro della giustizia Tarso Genro, la decisione del presidente Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva si limita a non concedere la sua estradizione in Italia. Per questo l'ex terrorista si trasformerà in immigrante in Brasile e ha bisogno si presentare una richiesta di visto presso il ministero del lavoro. Avendo Lula deciso per la sua permanenza nel paese, la concessione del visto è praticamente automatica. A partire dalla concessione di questo visto, Battisti potrà richiedere la carta d'identità, il permesso di lavoro e il passaporto brasiliano. Potrà anche andare all'estero quando lo desidera.

FARNESINA RICHIAMERA' AMBASCIATORE ITALIANO - La Farnesina si appresta a richiamare a Roma l'ambasciatore d'Italia in Brasile, Gherardo La Francesca per consultazioni. Lo si è appreso dalla Farnesina. "Il Ministro Frattini ha deciso di richiamare a Roma l'ambasciatore la Francesca per consultazioni volte a definire il percorso dell'azione giudiziaria del governo italiano in difesa delle proprie legittime aspettative basate sul Trattato bilaterale di estradizione e sulla sentenza del Tribunale Supremo brasiliano". E' quanto si legge in un comunicato della Farnesina sul caso Battisti.

ITALIA RICORRERA' A TRIBUNALE FEDERALE - "La repubblica italiana, con il dovuto rispetto alle istituzioni brasiliane, farà ricorso al Supremo Tribunale Federale contro la pratica di un atto evidentemente illegale ed abusivo". Lo ha detto oggi l'avvocato brasiliano del governo italiano, Nabor Bulhoes, all'Agencia Brasil. L'avvocato ha spiegato che "nel contesto in cui il Supremo Tribunale Federale ha respinto il rifugio e ha concesso l'estradizione, lo stesso ha competenza costituzionale, che è privatamente sua, mentre restava solo al presidente Lula di rispettare il trattato di estradizione bilaterale". Secondo Bulhoes il trattato deve essere rispettato perché "internamente al Brasile è una legge federale speciale, e internazionalmente è fonte di diritto internazionale".

MIN.ESTERI BRASILE, NOTA ITALIA IMPERTINENTE - Il Governo brasiliano considera "impertinente in particolare nel riferimento personale a Lula" la nota diffusa ieri dal Governo italiano circa il caso Battisti. Lo ha sottolineato il ministro degli esteri brasiliano, Celso Amorim, leggendo una nota ufficiale del governo brasiliano.

Oriano Mattei : MORTO MILITARE ITALIANO IN AFGHANISTAN.

31 Dicembre 2010

Matteo Miotto, veneto di Thiene, si trovava nel Paese da luglio. La Russa: rabbia per fatalità


Un alpino è stato ucciso in Afghanistan. Il caporal maggiore Matteo Miotto era in forza al 7/o reggimento alpini di Belluno ed è stato ucciso mentre era in servizio all'interno della base avanzata 'Snow' nella valle del Gulistan. Miotto, 24 anni, veneto di Thiene, si trovava in Afghanistan da luglio.

Assieme agli uomini del suo reparto e a una componente del genio era impiegato nella Task Force South East, la task Force italiana che dal primo settembre ha iniziato ad operare nell'area al confine con l'Helmand.

Il militare italiano è stato ucciso "a seguito di un colpo di arma da fuoco" mentre si trovava "all'interno della base" di Buji, dove prestava servizio. Lo si apprende da fonti militari. Il proiettile, riferiscono le stesse fonti, è penetrato in prossimità della spalla, nella parte lasciata scoperta dal giubbetto, ed ha raggiunto organi vitali. Nonostante i soccorsi, immediati, non c'é stato niente da fare. I fatti sono avvenuti alle 15, ora locale.

Nel Gulistan (provincia di Farah), una delle zone più 'calde' del settore affidato al controllo dei militari italiani, al confine con l'Helmand, dal primo settembre operano gli alpini del 7/o reggimento di Belluno, che costituiscono l'ossatura della Task force south east, composta anche da militari di altri reparti.

Il 4 ottobre scorso, proprio nella valle del Gulistan, si verificò l'imboscata in cui morirono altri quattro soldati italiani. L'area affidata al controllo degli alpini, denominata Box Tripoli, era un tempo sotto comando statunitense.

In questi pochi mesi i militari italiani hanno portato avanti una serie di iniziative (tra cui quattro progetti di cooperazione civile-militare) con "notevole successo", come ha sottolineato solo qualche settimana fa il generale David Petraeus, comandante della missione Isaf in Afghanistan, in visita agli alpini del Gulistan.

NAPOLITANO PARTECIPA AL DOLORE DEI FAMILIARI E A CORDOGLIO FORZE ARMATE - Il Presidente della Repubblica, Giorgio Napolitano, appresa con profonda commozione la notizia dell'attentato nel distretto di Gulistan in cui ha perso la vita un militare italiano, impegnato nella missione internazionale per la pace e la stabilità in Afghanistan - si legge in una nota - esprime i suoi sentimenti di solidale partecipazione al dolore dei famigliari del caduto e al cordoglio delle Forze Armate.

SCHIFANI,ITALIANO CADUTO IN LOTTA AL TERRORISMO - "Un altro caduto italiano nella lotta al terrorismo internazionale e per la tutela della pace, della democrazia e della sicurezza internazionale. Una nuova pagina dolorosa per l'Italia". Così il Presidente del Senato, Renato Schifani, subito dopo aver appreso la notizia dell'uccisione di un militare italiano in Afghanistan. "Il nostro Paese - ha aggiunto il Presidente del Senato - sta pagando un pesantissimo prezzo di sangue per la pace in una delle aree più difficili e tormentate del pianeta". "Desidero in questa occasione rinnovare la solidarietà e l'abbraccio ideale a tutti i nostri soldati impegnati nella fondamentale missione in Afghanistan e nelle altre operazioni all'estero. Sentimenti che ebbi già avuto modo di esprimere la vigilia di Natale nel corso della mia visita alla base di Herat. Ai familiari del soldato caduto e al Capo di Stato Maggiore della Difesa, gen. Vincenzo Camporini - conclude il Presidente Schifani - giunga il sentimento del più profondo cordoglio e la più sentita vicinanza mia personale e dell'intera Assemblea di Palazzo Madama".

LA RUSSA, RABBIA PER FATALITA' - "Il nostro soldato è stato colpito da un solo colpo in uno dei punti scoperti sia da protezioni fisse che personali: quindi una fatalità, che fa ancora più rabbia". Lo ha detto all'ANSA il ministro della Difesa, Ignazio La Russa, confermando che il militare è stato ucciso da un cecchino. "I cecchini non sono una novità, ma finora non avevano mai ferito nessuno", ha detto il ministro.

IL CORDOGLIO DI FRATTINI -

Il Ministro degli Esteri Franco Frattini esprime il suo personale cordoglio e quello della Farnesina per la tragica scomparsa del militare italiano avvenuta oggi in Afghanistan. "Il primo pensiero va ai familiari del nostro soldato, ai quali siamo particolarmente vicini, consapevoli - si legge nella nota - che il dolore è ancora più grande in questi giorni destinati alla festa e che per loro si trasformano in momenti di tragica disperazione". "Quello odierno - aggiunge Frattini - è in termini di tempo l'ultimo, carissimo contributo pagato dai nostri soldati nella loro encomiabile lotta contro il terrorismo internazionale, finalizzata a garantire pace e sicurezza al nostro Paese ed alla nostra società". "Il modo migliore per onorare la memoria dei giovani e delle giovani che hanno pagato con la vita l'impegno del nostro Paese per sconfiggere il terrorismo è mantenere salda la rotta e proseguire, con la professionalità e l'impegno di sempre e che tutti riconoscono ai nostri soldati, nello sforzo per favorire quanto prima il processo di transizione ed afghanizzazione che consentirà di affidare all'esercito ed alla polizia afgani il controllo del proprio territorio", conclude Frattini.

DI PIETRO, VICINI A FAMILIARI MILITARE MORTO - vicini ai famigliari del militare morto in Afghanistan. A loro e a tutti i soldati impegnati in quei territori esprimiamo tutto il nostro cordoglio. Quest'anno si chiude con un sentimento di dolore per un'altra vittima di questa brutta guerra. Oggi è un giorno di lutto, un giorno di silenzio e non ribadiremo le nostre posizioni, ma chiediamo al governo di venire a riferire in Parlamento al più presto". Lo afferma il presidente dell'Italia dei Valori, Antonio Di Pietro.

Oriano Mattei : Arresti per attentato a sede Lega

31 Dicembre 2010


VARESE -Sono due le persone coinvolte nelle indagini sull'attentato della notte tra il 28 e il 29 dicembre alla sede della Lega Nord di Gemonio, a poca distanza dall'abitazione del leader leghista Umberto Bossi. Secondo quanto si è saputo, una sarebbe stata fermata, mentre la seconda sarebbe stata denunciata.

Nel corso dell'operazione della scorsa notte, gli investigatori avrebbero trovato del materiale utile alla comparazione con i due grossi petardi che hanno mandato in frantumi la vetrata della sede del partito.

Il provvedimento di fermo, a quanto si è saputo, sarebbe scattato in quanto il giovane coinvolto nelle indagini sull'attentato alla sede leghista sarebbe stato trovato in possesso di materiale pericoloso nel corso di una perquisizione. Il pm di Varese Sara Arduini chiederà nelle prossime ore la convalida del provvedimento che scaturisce appunto dal materiale trovato in possesso del giovane, mentre un'altra persona è stata denunciata a piede libero. Resta ancora da stabilire, a quanto si è appreso, il ruolo eventualmente ricoperto nell'attentato alla sede della Lega a Gemonio.

Sono entrambi di Gemonio i due giovani coinvolti nelle indagini sull'attentato dei giorni scorsi alla sede della Lega Nord del paese in cui vive Umberto Bossi. Al fermato, Marco Previati, 28 anni, e al denunciato a piede libero, a quanto si è saputo, è contestata la violazione della legge sulle armi. Al di là dell'accusa formalizzata i due sono comunque sospettati di aver preso parte all'attentato. In casa di Marco P. infatti, sarebbero stati trovati della polvere pirica e dei laccetti in velcro simili a quelli utilizzati per incollare alla vetrata della sede del partito i due grossi petardi che l'hanno infranta.

Oriano Mattei : Godina Šarića

31 Dicembre 2010

Da se na Balkanu vrijeme mjeri kineskim kalendarom, 2010. bi bila poznata kao „Godina Šarića". U sjenci starijeg brata Darka i mlađeg Duška, proteklih 365 dana obilježila su zvučna imena kontroverznih poslovnih ljudi, kriminalnih bosova, unajmljenih ubica, osoba osumnjičenih za nezakonito prisvajanje miliona eura - Stanka Subotića Caneta, Sretena Jocića zvanog Joca Amsterdam, Slobodana Đurovića Kardinala, Roberta Matanića, Zvezdana Terzića...

Tek pred kraj godine dio „slave" su kontroverznim pljevaljskim biznismenima okrnjili bivši i sadašnji premijer(i) zemalja u regionu, Ivo Sanader, Milo Đukanović i Hašim Tači.

Na početku 2010. srpsko pravosuđe je raspisalo međunarodnu potjernicu za Darkom Šarićem, koji je kasnije optužen za šverc blizu 2,7 tone kokaina iz Latinske Amerike u Evropu. Niz njegovih pomagača je uhapšen u Srbiji, Italiji i Sloveniji. Na kratko se to dogodilo i u Crnoj Gori sa osobama koje su prema srpskoj policiji bile u vrhu Šarićevog narko klana, ali brzo su puštene zbog nedostatka dokaza. Tek krajem godine u Pljevljima je uhapšen Duško Šarić, po istoj zakonskoj osnovi po kojoj italijanske vlasti traže starijeg brata Darka, a to je saučesništvo u kriminalnoj organizaciji sa ciljem švercovanja droge.

U međuvremenu je u Srbiji zaplijenjena značajna imovina Šarićevih, nekoliko kuća u Novom Sadu, stanovi u Novom Beogradu, hoteli u Subotici, luksuzni automobili, namještaj. Veliki dio te imovine je rasprodat na aukcijama u Beogradu.

U septembru je počelo i suđenje Šarićevoj grupi, s tim da glavnooptuženi Darko i njegova „desna ruka," po optužnici, Goran Soković ne sjede na optuženičkoj klupi. Darku Šariću, koji se u dva maha javio pismima svom beogradskom advokatu Zdenku Tomanoviću iz jedne „evroazijske zemlje", policije više zemalja nisu uspjele da uđu u trag. Mediji su najčešće spominjali da se krije u Crnoj Gori, zatim u Švajcarskoj, pominjalo se i da možda nije među živima.

Kako je godina odmicala bilo je sve više informacija da je Darko Šarić ne samo poznavao već imao i poslovne veze sa Stankom Subotićem, čije se ime pominje u kriminalnim aferama u regionu od sredine 1990-tih, od kada potiče i njegovo prijateljstvo sa Milom Đukanovićem. Subotić, protiv koga se u Srbiji već nekoliko godina vodi sudski proces za šverc cigareta, ovih dana je u jednoj TV emisiji priznao da ga je Marko Mišković, sin vodećeg srpskog tajkuna Miroslava Miškovića, upoznao sa braćom Šarić i da su ga oni posjećivali u Ženevi. Cane je izjavio da je Marko Mišković „odličan drug i prijatelj" sa Šarićima, ali je priznao da je i sam imao poslovne kombinacije sa starijim bratom.

Prema informacijama iz srpske policije, Darko Šarić je zagospodario tržištem droga u regionu kada je u Beogradu u proljeće 2009, uhapšen balkanski ,,narko-bos" Joca Amsterdam, osumnjičen za niz teških kriminalnih djela u Srbiji, Bugarskoj, Holandiji. Protiv Jocića u ovom času srpsko pravosuđe vodi dva odvojena procesa, za podstrekivanje na dvostruko ubistvo u Beogradu iz 1990-tih i za organizovanje atentata u Zagrebu u oktobru 2008, na vlasnika i glavnog urednika hrvatskog časopisa Nacional Iva Pukanića i njegovog saradnika Nika Franića. Pored Jocića, u Srbiji su za ubistvo Pukanića i Franića optuženi i Željko Milovanović i Milenko Kuzmanović.

U optužnici Tužilaštva za organizovani kriminal Srbije navodi se da su Jocić i Milovanović krivična djela izvršili djelovanjem u okviru osmočlane međunarodne organizovane kriminalne grupe čiji su pripadnici bili državljani Srbije, Hrvatske i Bosne i Hercegovine. Optuženi su, prema navodima optužnice, ubili Pukanića za novčanu nagradu od najmanje 1,5 miliona eura.

Likvidacija Pukanića, jedno od najpoznatijih ubistava novinara u zemljama u regionu, dobilo je u međuvremenu epilog u Zagrebu poslije jednogodišnjeg procesa.. Županijski sud u Zagrebu osudio je 3. novembra šestoricu optuženih na ukupno 150 godina zatvora zbog ubistva Pukanića i Franjića.

Poslije niza susreta ministara unutrašnjih poslova Srbije i Hrvatske Ivice Dačića i Tomislava Karamarka, u junu su njihove kolege iz resora pravosuđa Snežana Malović i Ivan Šimonović potpisali Ugovor o međusobnom izručenju osoba koje su okrivljene i osuđene za organizovani kriminal i korupciju. Beograd i Zagreb su ocijenili da se radi o istorijskom ugovoru za obje zemlje jer nije poznato ni u regionalnoj pravnoj praksi, ali ni u svijetu da su dvije države potpisale sličan ugovor.

Prvi na koga je primijenjen taj dokument bio je notorni ubica Sretko Kalinić, osuđen u Srbiji na 30 godina zbog učešća u ubistvo premijera Zorana Đinđića u martu 2003.

Saradnja policija i pravosudnih organa u regionu je potpisima Malovićke i Šimonovića podstaknuta. Posljednjeg vikenda u oktobru ministarka Malović i ambasador Crne Gore Igor Jovović u Beogradu su potpisali Sporazum o izručenju vlastitih državljana. Od tada je, prema podacima srpske policije, uhapšeno ukupno 17 osoba. U Srbiji je privedeno 11, a u Crnoj Gori šest osoba.

Na kraju 2010, međunarodni kanal za šverc kokaina iz Južne Amerike u Evropu i dalje je funkcionisao. Samo u posljednja dva mjeseca u Argentini su uhapšena četiri Šarićeva kurira i zaplijenjeno 30 kilograma kokaina.

Nova 2011. godina biće vjerovatno nastavak borbe protiv organizovanog kriminala i korupcije. Samo što će u njoj češće biti pominjana neka druga imena koja su pominjana u političkim rubrikama, a ne kriminalnima hronikama.


Kome zvone zvona

Izraz ,,sanaderizacija" ušao je u rječnike zemalja na zapadnom Balkanu nakon afere pokrenute hapšenjem bivšeg hrvatskog premijera Iva Sanadera, 10. decembra u Austriji Da li je Sanader samo prvi u nizu? Da li je slučajnost što trojica čelnika zemalja u regionu prolaze kroz teške trenutke u političkoj karijeri, raspravljaju mediji na Balkanu, ali i u Evropskoj uniji.

Sanaderu je sud u Salzburgu produžio pritvor za 30 dana. Milo Đukanović bio je prisiljen da odstupi sa mjesta premijera Crne Gore. Protiv premijera Hašima Tačija vodi se istraga, jer je navodno šefovao zločinačkom organizacijom koja je trgovala organima zarobljenih Srba i drugih žitelja Kosova tokom rata 1998-1999.

Hrvatsko pravosuđe Sanadera tereti da je organizovao grupu koja je izvlačila novac iz državnih firmi. Đukanovića, pak, već godinama spominju u kontekstu duvanske mafije, mada je poslije istrage koja se u Italiji vodila protiv najdugovječnijeg političara sa prostora bivše Jugoslavije slučaj ,,arhiviran" jer ga je štitio imunitet premijera.

Za razliku od Sanadera, Đukanović želi da ostane na čelu DPS-a i u svojoj zemlji, primjećuju mediji u regionu. Međutim, kako pišu hrvatski mediji, ne treba isključiti mogućnost da će neka crnogorska verzija Uskoka zakucati i Đukanoviću na vrata.

Za dio medija u regionu, ali i eksperte iz ljubljanskog IFIMES, ne postoji sumnja da se poslije Sanaderove iznenadne ostavke u ljeto 2009, i sadašnja ostavka Mila Đukanovića dovodi u vezu sa optužbama za kriminal i korupciju, kao i da je uslijedila zbog pritisaka međunarodne zajednice i EU.

Predsjednik IFIMES-a Zijad Bećirović smatra da poslije hapšenja Sanadera ,,ni jedan političar najvišeg ranga više ne može biti siguran da neće biti uhapšen zbog određenih djela". On i ostavku crnogorskog premijera Mila Đukanovića povezuje sa optužbama za organizovani kriminal i korupciju.

„Veoma utemeljene" primjedbe na račun korupcije i Đukanovića mogle su se čuti već godinama, izjavio je predsjednik Grupe država za borbu protiv korupcije GRECO Drago Kos. GRECO je tijelo Savjeta Evrope, a Kos je nekadašnji visoki zvaničnik policije Slovenije.

Kos smatra da je EU jedina realna politička snaga koja može da prisili države da počnu sa stvarnom borbom protiv korupcije.


Milan BOŠKOVIĆ

Oriano Mattei : Bitka za Prvu familiju d.o.o.

31 Dicembre 2010

Od čega će živjeti diplomirani ekonomista Milo Đukanović? Ostaće šef DPS-a. Na raspolaganju u Dva sanduka mu je predsjednički kabinet renoviran i opremljen još 2006, kada je prvi put demisionirao; no, tamo je volonter, partijac je iz čiste ljubavi. Može nazad na poslaničku platu; alternativno, sljeduje ga „funkcionerska" na godinu dana.

Od kraja 2006. do početka 2008, sa 765 eura tadašnje poslaničke plate kao početnim kapitalom, već je zaradio (klevetnici tvrde - oprao) 10 miliona funti, pa su ga ljetos u Indipendentu rangirali na 20. mjesto najbogatijih državnika. I sada najavljuje reaktiviranje u svojim firmama gdje se, kaže legenda, za premijerskog zemana bio odrekao upravljačkih prava i „zamrznuo" svoj status.

UNIVERZITATS: Preduzetnik Milo Đukanović je počeo sa suvlasničkih 25 odsto u Univerzitatsu d.o.o., koji je osnovao skupa sa svojim bivšim profesorom dr Veselinom Vukotićem, građevinskim tajkunom Tomislavom Čelebićem i dr Draganom K. Vukčevićem. Triling eks-premijerovih partnera, vrijedi napomenuti, sjedi u filijali Atlantskog vijeća, nezvaničnoj ambasadi NATO-a u Crnoj Gori. Registrovali su Univerzitats 19. decembra 2006. i u kratkom roku – jedno vrijeme bez građevinske dozvole i riješenih imovinskih pitanja – izgradili kompleks Univerziteta Donja Gorica.

Nije poznato koliko je svojih para Đukanović stvarno uložio – možda ni cent? – da bi zavrijedio četvrtinu firme. Na Univerzitats se vodi zemljište od 12.038 kvadrata, dok je ukupna površina zdanja na sedam nivoa i pridodatog objekta prema katastru 17.000 kvadrata. Premda je to tek „prva faza", iz Čelebić kompani reklamiraju ga kao „najveći objekat u privatnom vlasništvu u Crnoj Gori".

No, „poslovni prostori u vanprivredi" Univerzitatsa su pod hipotekom kredita kod Crnogorske komercijalne banke (CKB) – dva od ukupno 7,9 miliona eura iz 2007. i jednim od dva miliona iz 2009, sa rokom otplate od 12 godina. Firma kod NLB Montenegrobanke ima kredit od 132.000 eura.

KAPITAL INVEST: Svoju stoprocentno prvu firmu Đukanović je sa 2.000 eura osnivačkog uloga registrovao 23. februara 2007. i to za konsalting i menadžment poslove. Prema verziji koju je objavila Uprava za sprječavanje pranja novca (u sastavu Ministarstva finansija, ministar bio Igor Lukšić), Đukanovićev Kapital invest d.o.o. – frima bez poslovnog rejtinga ili imovine – 11. jula 2007. sa „bankom iz Velike Brtitanije" sklapa ugovor o kreditu od 1,48 miliona eura, „čije se vraćenje garantuje kupovinom akcija" Prve banke. Đukanović akcije nije imao u momentu podizanja kredita, već je njih 11.657 kupio, prema službenoj verziji, 3. avgusta 2007.

Druga, neslužbena, na činjenicama zasnovana verzija (objavili smo je u Monitoru, 19. februara 2009), ubjedljivije svjedoči o tome kako je bivši premijer kreditom postao milioner. Podigao ga je kod londonske filijale grčke Pireus banke, koja je u Srbiji kupila Atlas banku Duška Kneževića. Iz Ugovora o zalogu R-07101100027 od 11. oktobra 2007. doznaje se da je Kapital invest založio svega 8.000 akcija, ili 3.657 manje od deklarisanih.

Od podizanja kredita do zaloge, cijene akcija Prve banke vrtoglavo su skočile: sa 127,82 eura fiksiranih u kreditnom ugovoru na čak 867 eura. Za samo tri mjeseca Đukanović je bio ,,dobar" 5.913.440 eura.

PRVA BANKA: Kroz svu tu misterioznu komplikaciju je Đukanović stekao, legalizovao ili oprao svoj prvi milion ili milione i postao knjigovodstveno uredni suvlasnik Prve banke. U tome su mu pomogla povezana lica i akcionari te banke. Advokat Branko Čolović iz Beograda sa kancelarijom u Budvi, zastupao je Pireus banku, takođe i londonsku kompaniju Bepler i Džejkobson vlasnika Zorana Ćoća Bećirovića, Đukanovićevog kuma. Zoranov mlađi brat, Dragan Bećirović, akcionar je Prve banke, u kojoj je gazda Aco Acika Đukanović.

U ugovoru o zalogu i aneksu ugovora, kao kontakt podaci Kapital investa, upisani su telefonski broj i imejl registrovani na advokata Anu Kolarević, Đukanovićevu sestru, akcionarku Prve banke. Poput Čolovića, Kolarevićka je bila zastupnik Beplera i Džejkobsona i to ne samo onomad, tokom privatizacije hotela Avala u Budvi i Bjanka i Lipka u Kolašinu, već i periodu podizanja kredita za Kapital invest.

Tu su i drugi rodbinsko-poslovni spletovi oko Prve banke. Izvršni direktor Kapital investa, dr Radislav Jovović, predavač na Univerzitetu Mediteran Duška Kneževića, član je Odbora direktora Acikinog Republičkog zavoda za urbanizam i projektovanje. Većinski vlasnik Prve banke je bratu 2007. ne samo kadrovski pomogao, nego poklonio stan od 73 kvadrata u komšiluku (koji je eks-premijer spojio sa svojim) a sinovcu donirao dva poslovna prostora u PC Kruševac, pa ga Milova uža porodica rentira za 132.000 eura godišnje.

Kada je opet bio premijer, Đukanović je jula 2008. na berzi prodao (kupcu iz kruga „prve familije") svojih 2.540 akcija po cijeni od 610 eura – zarada 1,55 miliona eura. Krajem te godine objavljuje da je vratio kredit Kapital investa, pa kao premijer, akcionar bratovljeve banke i primalac njegovih „poklona" u nekretninama – inicira donošenje Zakona o podršci bankarskom sektoru i sa 44 miliona iz državnog budžeta spašava Prvu banku. Sada u noj posjeduje 10.466 akcija čija je nominalna vrijednost ukupno 1,38 miliona eura.

GLOBAL MONTENEGRO: Osim Acike, aktuelna je kombinacija sa još jednim igračem iz Prve banke. Firmu Global Montenegro d.o.o. je sa eurom osnivačkog kapitala januara 2007. registrovao Vuk Vučko Rajković, Milov kum i školski drug. Kao žovijalni predsjednik Upravog odbora, Vučko je Prvu banku doveo do faktičkog bankrota i protiv njega Specijalno tužilaštvo za organizovani kriminal već dvije godine vodi pretkrivični postupak.

Činjenica da je Vučko bio na čelu konkurentske banke nije bila prepreka Hipo Alpe-Adria Banci (HAAB) da odobri Global Montenegru 14. februara 2008. kredit sa višegodišnjim grejs periodom od pet miliona eura (u internoj reviziji HAAB-a pominje se cifra od 5,5 miliona).

Kada je kredit legao, 25. februara 2008. – par dana uoči reaktiviranja na funkciji premijera – Đukanović sa Vučkom sklapa Ugovor o prijenosu udjela bez naknade kojim su podijelili vlasništvo Global Montenegra. Kupuju parcelu od 20.229 kvadrata u Budvi (naselju Podkošljun), preko puta famozne Zavale.

SO Budva, pod rukovodstvom Rajka Kuljače, sredinom 2008. usvaja primjedbe i dopušta ucrtavanje dodatne podzemne garaže u bloku 40 na parceli br.1 DUP-a Podkošljun za objekat čiji je investitor Global Montenegro. Ali, nikakvi građevinski radovi u međuvremenu nijesu započeti. HAAB i Global Montenegro su 25. februara 2009. sklopili Aneks ugovora Br.5969/09, no nijesmo uspjeli doznati što u njemu piše.

O kreditu Global Montenegra Đukanović je krajem 2008. kazao: „Novac od kredita je prevazilazio potrebe plaćanja zemljišta". Kvadrat su platili oko 200 eura. Dodao je: ,,Partner nije želio da bez mog učešća dalje razvija projekat, tako da je on u fazi ispitivanja tržišta kome bi firmu i zemljište mogli prodati".

SURVIVOR: Tako stoje poznate činjenice oko eks-premijerovih firmi, koje će sada „odmrznuti". No, za razliku od vremena prve njegove demisije, poslovni ambijent se pod poznatim okolnostima radikalno promijenio.

Biće teško reprizirati konspiraciju sa kraja 2006; Acika je preko firme Monte nova na berzi tada preuzeo kontrolu nad Nikšićkom bankom (preimenovana u Prvu banku), dok je Ana Kolarević zastupala ,,80 odsto svih stranih kompanija i pojedinaca koji posluju u Crnoj Gori". Keš se slivao u Acikin buđelar, pa je mogao da „donira" bratu nekretnine; bio je dobitnik prodaja Telekoma ili CKB-a, muvanja sa vaučerima i na berzama; u njegovoj banci su deponovane pare državnih organa i preduzeća; ruski tovariši su aterirali sa kešom koji je trebalo oprati kupovinom nekretnina, pa su svi partijski klanovi – rodbinski, kumovski, zavičajni – profitirali i živjeli u miroljubivoj koegzistenciji.

Ni nalik vremenu današnjem. Milo Đukanović je početkom 2000-ih reklamirao ulaganje vaučera kod Veselina Veskobara Barovića, jer Eurofond „vode moji prijatelji"; godinama su bili dio priče o „tranzitu duvana", skupa u Italiji osumnjičeni za mafijaško udruživanje... sada Eurofond tuži Prvu banku, tvrde da im je uzela 1,56 miliona eura a Prva banka pokušava prodajom nekretnina Eurofonda namiriti svoja potraživanja prema Veskobaru.

Ko bi rekao da je Svetozar Marović oktobra 2007, kao suvlasnik u Moninvestu (firma ima važnu ulogu u „slučaju Zavala") kroz ,,zatvorenu dokapitalizaciju" za pola miliona eura kupio 2,2 odsto akcija Prve banke po nominalnoj cijeni od 127,82 eura, iako su tada vrijedile oko 900 eura – zarada Moninvesta u toj transakciji je bila oko tri miliona eura; već 26. juna 2008. Marović je (Ugovor br. 24029/08) od Prve banke dobio i kredit od 578.000 eura, itd.

Ni nalik, velimo, današnjici. U eks-premijerovom okruženju, nakačenom dvije decenije na Prvu familiju d.o.o. sve su brojniji neprijateljski nastrojeni skeptici: Milo nije više reinkarnacija Mide, mitološkog kralja koji u zlato, pardon, u prvofamilijarno blago pretvori sve što dotakne.

U toku su međusobna potraživanja i naplate dugova. Slijedi finalni „survivor". Ko pobijedi zaradiće, ko preživi pričaće.


Vladimir JOVANOVIĆ

Oriano Mattei : Za(h)vala Maroviću

31 Dicembre 2010

Za(h)vala Maroviću
Petak, 31 Decembar 2010 NOVI BROJ - Novi broj - Tekstovi
E-mail Ispis PDF
Svi su u DPS-u jednaki, samo su neki nedodirljivi. To je glavni utisak o događajima koji su se dramatično smjenjivali posljednjih dana 2010. Zavala jeste čisti kriminal. Ali, malo ko vjeruje da je slučaj predsjednika Opštine Budva Rajka Kuljače, potpredsjednika Dragana Marovića i ostalih bez političke pozadine. Da su hapšenja rezultat rada nezavisnog pravosuđa, koje se probudilo baš u momentu kada Milo Đukanović ide na rezervni položaj. Vidite kako je vladajućim poslanicima strah zaledio oči. Misle ko je sljedeći.

Ajde, za trenutak, da povjerujemo da je ovo početak velikog spremanja zemlje kandidata, koja mora da raščisti sa korupcijom na visokom nivou i da ubaci velike ribe u mrežu. Ako je tako, onda će u slučaju Zavala red doći na Svetozara Marovića kao inicijatora posla i Branimira Gvozdenovića koji je papirima i dozvolama opskrbio taj sumnjivi projekat.

Budva je simbol crnogorskog sloma i haosa, a nezavršena Zavala stoji kao utvara, spomenik gramzivosti i nasilja nad zakonom i prirodom. Moglo bi biti logično što se odatle krenulo. Ali, kada bi u Crnoj Gori pravada bila za sve jednaka, pored opštine Budva, morali bi se pročešljati poslovi i u drugim gradovima.

Đukanović je do sada vladao tako što je najbližima iz DPSDP-a davao dio kolača, a za sebe je zadržavao najbolje. U takvom poretku stasale su autonomne snage, feudi u okviru DPS-a: Marović, Mugoša, Milošević...

MANS je, kao i u slučaju Kuljače, podnio više krivičnih prijava protiv gradonačelnika glavnog grada Miomira Mugoše. I to zbog divlje gradnje, sumnjivih transakcija sa gradskim zemljištem, knjiženja opštinske zemlje na sopstveno ime. Mugoša je, kao i Marović u Budvi, od Podgorice napravio atar i radio je što mu se htjelo. Čarapićeva bi imala šta da radi i u Baru, Bijelom Polju, Pljevljima...

Od grada do grada. Ali, i od posla do posla: Prva banka, Željezara, Kombinat aluminijuma, šverc devedesetih, pa sve do deportacije bosanskih izbjeglica. U svemu tome je premijer, lično ili sa porodicom i prijateljima. Sumnjivi poslovi Đukanovićevog klana po obimu su višestruko veći od Zavale, a posljednice dugoročnije i teže. Evo, samo primjer Kombinata aluminijuma, naše najveće fabrike od koje zavisi repro lanac Crne Gore. Taj je posao na mišiće izgurao Milo Đukanović. Umjesto da zemlja profitira i da se fabrika modernizuje, više od pola milijarde eura za samo nekoliko godina Đukanovićeva vlada je dala što kroz subvencije za struju, što kroz garancije i kredite, formalnom vlasniku KAP-a, ruskom oligarhu Olegu Deripaski. Da ne pominjemo transakcije Prve banke Aca, Mila i Ane.

Ključna je pitanje zašto Zavala a ne i Avala, zašto desalinizacija a ne i Kombinat, zašto Marovići a ne i Đukanovići. Ko hapsi - pravosuđe pod pritiskom Evropske unije, ili se bivši premijer iz rezervnog položaja obračunava sa potencijalnim partijskim rivalima i navodno bori protiv korupcije, ogrnut u crnogorske identitetske simbole.

Brzo ćemo dobiti odgovor na ovo pitanje. Ako Đukanović strahom i prijetnjama hapšenjem uspostavi totalnu diktaturu u partiji to će biti dodatno urušavanje Crne Gore. U tome bi bivšem premijeru, pored poslušnika iz DPS-a, od pomoći mogli biti svi oni koji ovih dana od njega prave božanstvo. Propagandisti iz javnih i privatnih servisa, zabrinute crnogorske patriote i posebno Ranko Krivokapić. Oni vođu poistovjećuju sa opstankom države, crkve, jezika... Kao što su devedesetih srpski nacionalisti izjednačavali Miloševića i Srbiju.

Prirodno je, onda, što je prvi na meti bio baš Marović. Najači u DPS-u poslije Đukanovića, dugogodišnji potencijalni rival, koji je u tandemu sa Filipom Vujanovićem i Željkom Šturanovićem imao jako uporište u stranci. Udaranjem na Marovićev klan, veliki majstor mogao bi da ubije sve različitosti, kako bi sa nove stolice vladao državom sistemom namjesništva.

Može li biti da plan propadne? Da Evropa zaista ozbiljno pritegne Crnu Goru, da novo vrijeme i obaveze proizvedu stvarnost u kojoj Đukanović, ma šta činio, sebe ne može spasiti od sudbine Iva Sanadera.


Milka TADIĆ MIJOVIĆ

Wikileaks : Viewing cable 10BELGRADE3, Post ICJ Opinion: Serbia to Continue Obstructing Kosovo

31 Dicembre 2010

VZCZCXRO5704
RR RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHBW #0003/01 0121330
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 121330Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0565
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMCSUU/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0010

Tuesday, 12 January 2010, 13:30
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BELGRADE 000003
NOFORN
SIPDIS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO AMCONSUL ALMATY
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG
EO 12958 DECL: 2020/01/12
TAGS PGOV, PREL, KV, SR
SUBJECT: Post ICJ Opinion: Serbia to Continue Obstructing Kosovo
Independence
CLASSIFIED BY: Bradford J. Bell, Acting Economics Chief, US Department of State, Economics Section; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) We expect Serbia will continue to obstruct and undermine Kosovo’s sovereignty in the lead up to and following the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion, which most believe will be ambiguous. Regardless of the position taken by the ICJ, Kosovo’s independence and sovereignty are irrefutable. Serbia’s government is unified in its refusal to accept that fact but is internally divided regarding how to push its claim to Kosovo after the ICJ issues its opinion in spring 2010. President Boris Tadic and his office appear willing to follow our and the EU’s advice and to quietly accept any outcome while moving Serbia toward EU integration, but are lacking a coordinated plan to do so. In contrast, Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic, driven by personal interest in self promotion and a misperception of the domestic political landscape, is planning a new diplomatic offensive on Kosovo on the heels of any ICJ opinion. Absent an alternative approach by Tadic, we expect Jeremic’s more confrontational plan will win out. To temper Serbia’s post ICJ strategy and to limit its duration and impact, we will need to be well coordinated with our EU allies and encourage the EU to wisely use its significant remaining carrots and sticks with Serbia to elicit the cooperative resolution of this issue, while assuring Kosovo’s territorial integrity. We must also be prepared to fight Serbia in the UNGA if necessary. End Summary.
Preparing for the Advisory Opinion
----------------------------------
¶2. (C) Over the next several months as the ICJ deliberates, we expect Foreign Minister Jeremic to maintain an offensive posture and continue his globe spanning travels, heralding the upcoming ICJ decision at each stop. He will try to prevent any further recognitions of Kosovo during this interim period and to shore up support from Serbia’s allies, particularly Russia, the EU non-recognizers (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain) and members of the Non-Aligned Movement. Previewing his intentions, Serbian media reported on December 25 that Jeremic sent a letter to foreign ministers of countries which have not recognized Kosovo, expressing gratitude for upholding the UN Charter and the hope that they would continue to respect Serbia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. In addition, Jeremic wrote that the ICJ opinion “must not be obstructed in any way,” suggesting that political meddling could influence the court’s opinion. Absent direct intervention from President Tadic, we expect Jeremic will continue his quixotic global campaign with vigor.
ICJ Opinion Likely to be Ambiguous
----------------------------------
¶3. (C) The Serbian government expects the ICJ to deliver its opinion to the UN General Assembly by spring 2010. Media and analysts have speculated that the most likely scenario is for the ICJ to issue multiple opinions, with some supporting Kosovo and others Serbia. Kosovo Minister Goran Bogdanovic told local media on December 25 that he expected there would be significant political pressure to make the ICJ’s decision “more neutral.” Serbia is thus preparing for an outcome that remains ambiguous, with both sides claiming victory. While the ruling’s expected ambiguity could provide Serbia an opportunity to end its campaign against Kosovo, Foreign Minister Jeremic has already said Serbia will take no action that implies Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo (reftel).
¶4. (C) Serbian politicians, including influential Minister of Labor and Social Affairs Rasim Ljajic, have told us that Serbia cannot merely forget Kosovo out of fear that the vocal and numerous opposition will accuse Tadic of treason. Ljajic pointed to the recent Progressive (SNS) victory in the Belgrade municipality of Vozdevac as a clear sign that the opposition has the potential to
BELGRADE 00000003 002 OF 004
pose a real threat to the governing coalition. As a result, Serbian officials are now contemplating how vocal and obstructive the GoS should be after any final ICJ ruling in order to assure their political majority.
Tadic’s Unclear Path
--------------------
¶5. (C) Over the past month several European interlocutors have stressed with President Tadic the need to move beyond Kosovo and to focus on Serbia’s European integration. We believe the message is beginning to sink in with Tadic, but he still lacks a coordinated strategy to implement. Tadic’s National Security Advisor, Miki Rakic, told Charge Brush on December 10that the government still had no plan for its post-ICJ policy and was only then beginning to consider alternatives. In separate meetings with Charge Brush on December 28 and 29, Defense Minister Sutanovac and informal presidential advisor Srdjan Saper both seemed confused when Charge Brush asked about Tadic’s post-ICJ strategy, with neither even willing to speculate on what the President might be thinking.
¶6. (C) EU sources in Belgrade confirm that during his December 15 meeting with Tadic EU Director General for Foreign Affairs Robert Cooper encouraged Serbia to think carefully about how it would handle Kosovo issues after the ICJ opinion. According to our EU sources, Tadic and his foreign policy advisor Jovan Ratkovic told Cooper that Serbia was currently analyzing four possible post ICJ scenarios, but had yet to “draw any firm conclusions.” Specifically Tadic mentioned consideration of the China-Taiwan model and the “two Germanies” scenario, recognizing that any outcome would need to be tailored to Kosovo’s “special situation.” Tadic reportedly told Cooper that after the ICJ advisory opinion Belgrade would be more than ready to talk to Pristina -even directly- as long as talks were not perceived or portrayed as Serbia directly or indirectly recognizing Kosovo.
Thoughts of Partition still in their Heads
------------------------------------------
¶7. (C) Tadic reportedly told Cooper that he recognized that there needed to be a degree of clarity and finality to any outcome, cognizant that the EU would be unwilling to accept another “Cyprus-like” state as a member. Ratkovic more explicitly told Cooper that while Belgrade would need to accept that it would not govern Kosovo again, Kosovo would have to come to the realization that it would not effectively be able to extend its governance north of the Ibar river. Tadic reiterated to Cooper that ultimately Serbia’s post ICJ strategy was being developed to avoid Serbia being a problem to its international partners but where its “concerns were taken care of.”
¶8. (C) Belgrade’s Quint (U.S., UK, Germany, France, Italy) have frequently discussed the seriousness of Serbia’s plans. Although listening to FM Jeremic would lead one to believe that the Minister actually has a plan for new status talks, neither he nor any other GoS official has ever publicly fleshed out Serbian goals, much less the details for any such talks. In a January 6 conversation with ChargC) Brush, Ratkovic would say only that “Serbia did not send the Kosovo issue to the ICJ just to have it come back and blow everything up; we will use the ruling to increase regional stability.”
Jeremic’s Preferred Path
------------------------
¶9. (C) Despite claims from MFA Political Director Borko Stefanovic
BELGRADE 00000003 003 OF 004
to Charge Brush on December 21 that the MFA was seeking “a way out of its Kosovo strategy post ICJ” we believe FM Jeremic intends to continue to beat the Kosovo drum throughout 2010. Jeremic is reportedly championing an alternative scenario under which the GoS would seek to “legalize any ICJ opinion,” as MFA State Secretary Stefanovic told Cooper on December 14. Serbia’s goal could be to again use the UN to bolster the political legitimacy of its stance against Kosovo’s independence. We expect the MFA envisions a multi-month process during which Serbia would try to persuade the UN General Assembly to adopt a resolution welcoming the ICJ ruling (or perhaps the portions favorable to Serbia’s position) and calling for new negotiations as a result. If the UN effort is unsuccessful, the GoS might energize the NAM to issue a statement calling for new talks.
¶10. (C) Under Jeremic’s scenario we expect Serbia would aim to reopen negotiations on Kosovo’s status. The MFA would likely not seek direct talks with Pristina authorities but rather would insist upon a new, “impartial” international negotiator from a non-recognizing country. While Serbia’s goal would be to reopen talks, it would not be in any hurry to conclude them and instead would try to drag out any talks for years. The ruling Democratic Party (DS) would likely want to postpone any result until after parliamentary elections scheduled at the latest for May 2012.
EU’s Carrots and Sticks
-----------------------
¶11. (C) While no EU state expects Serbia to recognize Kosovo, Serbia’s EU path will remain muddled without recognizable and accepted borders between Serbia and Kosovo. The EU must lead the charge in making this clear to Serbia. The EU must be willing to offer Serbia carrots and sticks until there is a clearly accepted understanding of where Serbia ends and the Republic of Kosovo begins, while maintaining Kosovo’s current territorial integrity. Levers at the EU’s disposal include determining when to unblock the SAA with Serbia, the disbursement of IPA funds, and the speed with which the EU will consider Serbia’s recently submitted application for EU candidacy. We also must be wary of EU states offering Serbia the wrong carrots. The UK Ambassador to Belgrade recently suggested to us that we should no longer push for additional countries to recognize Kosovo, in an effort to dissuade Jeremic from his own globe-trotting efforts to dissuade recognitions.
U.S. Approach
------------
¶12. (C) The arrival of the new U.S. Ambassador, coupled with two upcoming CODELS (Voinovich and Pomeroy), may provide the USG excellent opportunities to help President Tadic orient his rhetoric to European integration and the benefits thereof. During his December 15 meeting with Secretary Clinton, Jeremic invited her to visit Serbia in 2010. A visit in advance of the ICJ decision (the first since Powell visited in 2003 for PM Djindjic’s funeral) would highlight USG support for Tadic’s EU path and help steer him away from any pressure to consider new status negotiations.
Comment
-------
¶13. (C) If Belgrade follows the path that President Tadic appears to favor, Serbia will be able to move forward with EU integration while still not recognizing Kosovo. If however, when the ICJ opinion is issued, Jeremic is the only one with a plan, the GOS is likely to pursue the misguided idea of continuing to battle in the UNGA. This course will at least delay and at worse threaten
BELGRADE 00000003 004 OF 004
Serbia’s EU aspirations. In either case, we must snuff out any further roundabout talk on partition by both President Tadic and Foreign Minister Jeremic.
¶14. (C) We must use the next few months before the ICJ issues its opinion to press Tadic to put the battle for Kosovo behind him once and for all and focus all of his government’s energy on EU accession. The initial step is to encourage our EU Quint members to clearly state to Jeremic and Tadic that Serbia risks complicating its EU path if it continues to push for new status negotiations after an ICJ opinion. EU Quint members in Belgrade have told us they intend to meet with Jeremic soon to stress this specific point, pending guidance from their capitals. This message, however, will need to be reinforced directly by EU capitals and from Brussels. If our strategy is to be effective, we need to encourage Brussels to have a clear, coordinated policy regarding the linkage between Serbia’s EU path and resolving practical issues with Kosovo. If Serbia fails to heed this message we and our like minded European partners will need to prepare to defeat any new Kosovo resolution in the UNGA next fall. This will require an aggressive strategy to counter Serbia’s lobbying.
¶15. (C) Any strategy must include a coordinated statement from Washington and European capitals at the highest levels that Kosovo’s partition is not an option and that continued defacto partition through Serbian interference will also put Serbia’s EU membership on hold. This will require a coordinated effort with the European Union, which must be persuaded to use its leverage in tangible ways. A visit by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary to Belgrade before the ICJ ruling would help solidify this message both in Belgrade and in EU capitals. End Comment. PEDERSON

Wikileaks : Viewing cable 10RABAT22, WHY DID MOROCCO SEND DADIS CAMARA TO BURKINA FASO?

31 Dicembre 2010

VZCZCXRO8688
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRB #0022/01 0150743
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 150743Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1046
INFO RUEHRY/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY PRIORITY 0022
RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU PRIORITY 0599
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN 0005
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 0107
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0204
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 1295
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0143
RUEHJL/AMEMBASSY BANJUL 0111
RUEHCO/AMEMBASSY COTONOU 0065
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 0524
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0005
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0661
RUEHMV/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA 0574
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 3862
RUEHPA/AMEMBASSY PRAIA 0011
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 0727
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0463
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 0047
RUEHDS/USMISSION ADDIS ABABA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 000022

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/W, INR/AA AND NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2020
TAGS: PREL PINS GV MO UV
SUBJECT: WHY DID MOROCCO SEND DADIS CAMARA TO BURKINA FASO?

RABAT 00000022 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: DCM Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: Following the Secretary,s conversation with
Minister of Foreign Affairs Taieb Fassi Fihri, the Embassy
was surprised to learn January 12 of the Government of
Morocco,s (GOM,s) abrupt decision to discharge Guinean
junta leader Dadis Camara from the Mohammed V Military
Hospital in Rabat and send him by medical plane to
Ouagadougou. A January 11 telephone conversation between
King Mohammed VI and Burkinabe President Blaise Compaore,
Security Council consideration of the report on the September
28 massacre in Conakry, and pressure from Dadis, supporters
to repatriate him appear to have motivated the GOM,s action.
Believing that President Campaore may have torpedoed French,
Moroccan and U.S. efforts to find an African country that
would accept Dadis for resettlement, King Mohammed VI
intended to place responsibility for continued mediation of
the Guinea conflict squarely in Campaore,s court. The GOM
supported U.S. requests to keep Dadis Camara from using
contracted civilian air arranged by his supporters for return
to Conakry, and transported him via Moroccan &medical8
airlift to Burkina Faso without telling him that he would not
be returning to Conakry. Finally, the GOM pledged continued
support for U.S. and French requests to establish a new
residence for Dadis Camara to keep him out of Guinea and for
Guinea,s transition. End Summary.

¶2. (C) Embassy Rabat learned the afternoon of January 12
that the GOM intended to facilitate the departure of Dadis
Camara for Burkina Faso by the end of the day. According to
Ambassador Nasser Bourita, Chief of Staff of the Moroccan
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Dadis Camara was
aware of events in Guinea, had been well enough to travel for
at least three weeks, and his return had been formally
requested by the Guinean Ministry of Foreign Affairs through
the Moroccan Ambassador to Guinea. Bourita stated that King
Mohammed VI, who reportedly spoke with Burkina Faso President
Blaise Compaore on January 11, wanted Compaore to assume
responsibility as mediator of the Guinean conflict vice
remaining angry that he had not been party to the Rabat
Declaration of January 5. It was the king,s further desire
that Dadis Camara not be in Morocco when the UN Security
Council considered the contents of the United Nations report
on the September massacres in Guinea. Bourita asked for U.S.
support to keep the travel secret from the Government of
Burkina Faso, which he stated was not advised until shortly
before Dadis' arrival of the GOM,s intent to deliver Dadis
Camara to Ouagadougou that day.

¶3. (C) Embassy Rabat demarched the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs late January 12, requesting the GOM not permit Dadis
Camara to utilize a rented airplane arranged by his
supporters in Guinea for return to Guinea. The GOM honored
that request and Dadis Camara departed Rabat for Ouagadougou
between 1845 and 1900 GMT aboard a Moroccan &medical plane8
in the company of two Moroccan doctors (one an
anesthesiologist), a Moroccan nurse, a Lebanese doctor, and a
Guinean cardiologist. Dadis reportedly thought he was going
to Conakry and was &calm8 although the previous day, he had
reportedly told Fassi Fihri that he wanted to return to
Conakry to &cut off hands and heads.8 Camara landed in
Ouagadougou before 21:45 GMT on January 12.

¶4. (C) The GOM expressed its intent to reach out to the
Government of Saudi Arabia in support of the U.S. and French
demarches urging Saudi Arabia to accept Dadis Camara for
residency, just as King Mohammed VI had reached out to
Gabonese President Ali Bongo, who declined to host Dadis.
The GOM also reached out to General Sekouba Konate on both
January 12 and 13 to reassure him that Morocco remained

RABAT 00000022 002.2 OF 002

supportive of his efforts to lead a transition. The GOM reportedly also urged President Campaore to host Dadis Camara for more than five days -- as Campaore had reportedly stated the night Dadis arrived.

¶5. (C) Comment: The timing of the king,s decision was surprising, if not entirely unexpected. While not in accord with the spirit of the January 5 declaration, the GOM had always said that it needed a legal basis to keep Dadis and did not want him in Morocco when the Security Council considered the report on the massacre. The GOM remains hopeful that Dadis Camara will not return to Guinea.
Morocco,s willingness to work with the U.S. and France to prevent Dadis from taking contracted air back to Guinea, bought some time. Moreover, Morocco remains interested in participating in the international contact group meeting in Addis Ababa in late January. End Comment.

¶6. (U) Conakry and Tripoli minimize considered.


*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco
*****************************************
KAPLAN

Wikileaks : Viewing cable 10CARACAS43, Making Socialism Easier to Swallow

31 Dicembre 2010

VZCZCXRO2336
RR RUEHAG RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD
RUEHROV RUEHRS RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHTM
DE RUEHCV #0043/01 0192244
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 191258Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0292
INFO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 000043

SIPDIS
HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN PASS TO AMEMBASSY GRENADA
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PASS TO AMCONSUL QUEBEC
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2030/01/18
TAGS: PGOV KDEM ECON EINT VE
SUBJECT: Making Socialism Easier to Swallow

CLASSIFIED BY: Robin D. Meyer, Political Counselor, DOS, POL; REASON:
1.4(B), (D)

¶1. (C) Summary: President Chavez made socialism taste better with
the December 22 opening of a "socialist arepera" serving
Venezuelan-style tortillas at a fraction of their usual price.
The "Arepera Socialista" is planned to be the first of a chain of
Venezuelan government (GBRV) restaurants run by the Ministry of
Commerce. This restaurant is the GBRV's latest effort at setting
up alternatives to the private market, branding national symbols,
like the "arepa," as part of the Bolivarian Revolution, and
providing tangible benefits to its electoral base before the
September legislative elections. End Summary.



Socialism's Tangible - and Tasty -- Benefits



¶2. (U) President Chavez opened the "Arepera Socialista" with much
fanfare on December 22, advertising its low price and high quality
as symbolic of the benefits of his socialist revolution. (Note:
"Arepas" are a Venezualan-style thick cornmeal tortilla usually
used for a type of sandwich. End Note.) The restaurant, located
in a lower middle class neighborhood of Caracas, serves "arepas"
for about a fourth of their regular price. It is currently only
open during weekday mornings, although there are plans to extend
its hours, add coffee and fresh juice to its menu, and open two new
locations in working class neighborhoods.



¶3. (SBU) On a January 8 visit, EmbOffs witnessed a long line of
people waiting to get into the restaurant but surprisingly rapid
service. Inside, one wall was dominated by a quote in large red
lettering from Simon Bolivar: "The best system of government is
that which produces the greatest happiness." An employee managing
the line said the restaurant served 1,200 customers per day. One
man in line said he worked in the neighborhood and came every day
since the food was excellent and cheap.



Money is Secondary in Socialist Restaurants



¶4. (U) According to Minister of Commerce Eduardo Saman, people
can count on low prices at the "arepera socialista" because the
ingredients come from government-owned companies and other
products, such as boxed juices, come from government-owned
companies. Saman claimed the prices were sufficient to cover the
store's operating costs. He also announced on December 23 that a
chain of "Arepera Socialista" restaurants would be opened
throughout Venezuela as part of the Socialist Market Cooperatives
run by the Ministry of Commerce. Saman himself worked at the
restaurant on December 24; other Ministry of Commerce employees
were "volunteering" at the restaurant on the day of the Emboffs'
visit. About 30 people work at the restaurant.



¶4. (U) Besides the price, Saman highlighted another key difference
between socialist and capitalist "arepera": customers pay only
after eating, while "in fast food chains . . . they only think
about money." In the "Arepera Socialista," the cash register is in
a corner of the room and customers pay only after eating,
self-reporting how many of the "arepas" they ate.



Comment: Let Them Eat Arepas



¶5. (C) Facing high inflation, electricity and water rationing,
and failing public services, Chavez may see the "arepera
socialista" as a relatively quick and easy way to promote the

CARACAS 00000043 002 OF 002


benefits of "socialism" to his electoral base before the September
legislative elections. The challenge will be meeting demand
without raising the subsidized price or cutting quality.
CAULFIELD

Wikileaks : Viewing cable 10RABAT34, MOROCCO AND BURKINA FASO CONSULTATIONS ON GUINEA

31 Dicembre 2010

VZCZCXRO3319
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRB #0034/01 0201924
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 201924Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1060
INFO RUEHRY/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY PRIORITY 0024
RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU PRIORITY 0601
RUEHDS/USMISSION ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0994
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN 0007
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 0109
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0206
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0145
RUEHJL/AMEMBASSY BANJUL 0113
RUEHCO/AMEMBASSY COTONOU 0067
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 0526
RUEHFN/AMEMBASSY FREETOWN 0044
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0663
RUEHPC/AMEMBASSY LOME 0572
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 1187
RUEHPA/AMEMBASSY PRAIA 0013
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS 0061

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 000034

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF, AF/W, NEA, NEA/MAG AND INR/AA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2020
TAGS: PINS PGOV MARR PREL MO UV GV
SUBJECT: MOROCCO AND BURKINA FASO CONSULTATIONS ON GUINEA

REF: A. RABAT 0022
¶B. RABAT 0008

RABAT 00000034 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: DCM Robert Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: Moroccan Director General for Studies and
Documentation (DGED) Mansouri met with President Compaore,
Guinean General Konate and Guinean Captain Dadis Camara in
Ouagadougou on January 18. According to a senior Moroccan
MFA official, Mansouri assured Compoare that the GOM
appreciated his efforts to mediate the crisis in Guinea and
asked him to take a softer stance toward Konate as the leader
of the Guinea transition. To Konate, he offered Moroccan
political and material support for the transition. And to
Dadis, Mansouri promised continued Moroccan medical
assistance throughout his convalescence, but also strongly
dissuaded him from returning to Rabat. Looking to next
steps, the GOM urged the USG not to "rush" the International
Criminal Court's investigation, noting that while Morocco
does not condone "impunity" for the crimes that occurred in
Conakry, it also fears that an early ICC warrant for Dadis
Camara's arrest could destabilize the Guinea transition. End
Summary.

¶2. (C) On January 18, Ambassador Nasser Bourita, Director
General for Multilateral Relations and Chief of Staff to
Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi Fihri, offered DCM and PolCouns
a readout of Moroccan director of external intelligence and
national security advisor equivalent) Mohammed Yassine
Mansouri's trip to Ouagadougou. During his January 18 visit,
Mansouri met separately with Burkinabe President Blaise
Compaore, Guinean General Sekouba Konate, and Captian Moussa
Dadis Camara.

---------------------------------
Morocco's Messages in Ouagadougou
---------------------------------

¶3. (C) Mansouri delivered three separate messages to each of
his interlocutors, Bourita told us. First, he sought to reassure Compaore that Rabat greatly appreciated his personal
efforts to mediate the Guinea crisis, his close coordination
with Morocco, and Burkina Faso's willingness to receive
Dadis. Alluding to the Moroccan MFA's bitterness over its
perception that Compaore may have torpedoed French, Moroccan
and U.S. efforts to find an African country to accept Dadis
for resettlement -- and apparent Burkinabe anger at Rabat's
abrupt decision to send him by medical plane to Ouagadougou
(Ref A) -- Bourita said that Mansouri also calmed the waters
with Compaore and secured agreement for continued future
cooperation. Finally, Mansouri urged Compaore to "reflect a
bit" on his initial distrust of Konate, and to realize that,
given the circumstances and poor alternatives, he was not
necessarily a bad choice to lead the Guinean transition.

¶4. (C) In discussions with Konate, Mansouri assured him that
the GOM fully supported his efforts to lead the transition
and brainstormed with him as to what Morocco's most effective
roles might be, Bourita reported. Mansouri noted that
Morocco would be willing to offer materiel, funding and
observers for elections; economic and development assistance
to build water, electricity and other infrastructure; and, in
coordination with the U.S. and France, assistance in
rehabilitating and modernizing the armed forces.

¶5. (C) As for Dadis, Mansouri promised that Moroccan physicians would be with him throughout his convalescence in Ouagadougou, and that during that time the GOM would continue allow his wife and children, who remain in Rabat, to stay at Morocco,s expense. Dadis suggested that he wished to return to Morocco, Bourita said; however, Mansouri strongly dissuaded him. The GOM would send as many medical personnel

RABAT 00000034 002.2 OF 002

as necessary to Burkina Faso, Bourita added, but it would not
accept Dadis' return. "Since Dadis cannot come to Rabat,
Rabat will go to Dadis," he said with a smile.

------------------
Don't Rush the ICC
------------------

¶6. (C) Looking forward, Bourita warmly welcomed the
opportunity for Morocco to continue working closely with the
U.S. and France on Guinea's transition. The GOM likewise
welcomed the ICC's eventual investigation and likely issuance
of an arrest order for Dadis. However, he cautioned, the GOM
did not wish to see the ICC process result in additional
instability in Guinea. "Camara is unstable, and therefore
dangerous," he said; for this reason, France and the U.S.
should take care not to "rush" the ICC process. Morocco does
not support or accept impunity for Dadis, Bourita emphasized,
but France, the U.S., Morocco and their African partners
"need to move at a rate that is in harmony with one another
and that does not disturb the process." He added that in
addition to Mansouri's message to this effect in Ouagadougou,
the MFA was reiterating it to France, Gabon and Nigeria,
among others. Finally, Bourita said that the GOM looked
forward to receiving an invitation from the African Union to
attend the international contact group on Guinea,s January
26 meeting in Addis Ababa.


*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco
*****************************************
KAPLAN

Wikileaks : Viewing cable 10CARACAS69, Venezuela’s Economy in 2010: A Difficult and Uncertain Year

31 Dicembre 2010

VZCZCXRO5369
RR RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS
DE RUEHCV #0069/01 0221515
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 221514Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0330
INFO WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC

Friday, 22 January 2010, 15:14
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CARACAS 000069
SIPDIS
ENERGY FOR CDAY AND ALOCKWOOD
HQ SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
TREASURY FOR MKACZMAREK
NSC FOR DRESTREPO AND LROSSELLO
USDOC FOR 4332 MAC/ITA/WH/JLAO
AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN PASS TO AMEMBASSY GRENADA
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PASS TO AMCONSUL QUEBEC
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE
EO 12958 DECL: 2020/01/22
TAGS ECON, EFIN, VE
SUBJECT: Venezuela’s Economy in 2010: A Difficult and Uncertain Year
REF: 10 CARACAS 9; 09 CARACAS 1374; 10 CARACAS 27; 10 CARACAS 39 10 CARACAS 35; 10 CARACAS 5
CLASSIFIED BY: CAULFIELD, CDA, DOS, CDA; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
¶1. (C) Summary: 2010 is shaping up to be another bad year for Venezuela economically. After oil prices fell in the second half of 2008, Venezuela’s bubble burst and the economy contracted 2.9 percent in 2009. Analysts’ predictions for growth in 2010 range from anemic growth of 1.4 percent to a contraction of up to 3.4 percent. This range reflects a number of key unknowns, including the extent and economic impact of the electricity crisis, how the January 11 devaluation and related changes in the foreign exchange regime play out, the efficiency and effectiveness of what is almost surely to be increased fiscal spending, the pace of President Chavez’s march toward socialism, and the potential for social and political volatility. Mounting economic problems have contributed to a decline in Chavez’s popularity, which is an important reason Chavez agreed to a devaluation that would substantially increase government revenues and permit massive spending prior to the September legislative elections. Chavez is betting that short term measures can delay the long term consequences of his ill-conceived policies. End summary.
2009: The Year the Bubble Burst
¶2. (C) Venezuela’s bubble burst in 2009. From 2004 through 2008, government spending, fueled by high oil prices, triggered a boom in consumption that led to growth rates of 10.3 percent in 2005 and 2006, 8.4 percent in 2007, and 4.8 percent in 2008. This populist economic model was sustainable as long as oil prices continued to rise and even showed its underlying vulnerabilities when oil prices reached their peak in July 2008. The rapid fall in oil prices from July to December 2008 (from 129 to 32 USD per barrel for the Venezuelan basket) created a serious fiscal problem for the Venezuelan government (GBRV) in 2009, leading it to cut spending in real terms and issue a significant amount of debt. A decline in consumption followed, and Venezuela’s GDP contracted 2.9 percent in 2009. With little incentive for private sector investment in tradable goods, manufacturing was particularly hard hit, falling 7.2 percent in 2009. Only the gradual but steady rise in oil prices over the course of 2009 prevented a bad situation from turning far worse.
Growth Outlook for 2010: Continued Recession or at Best Anemic Growth
¶3. (C) Forecasts by local and international analysts for GDP growth in Venezuela in 2010 range from 1.4 percent (Ecoanalitica, a local consulting firm) to a contraction of 3.4 percent (the Economist Intelligence Unit). Perhaps the only thing analysts can agree on is that if there is growth it will be anemic, slower than Venezuela’s population growth rate of 1.6 percent. This variation in forecasts does not, as one might expect in an oil economy, come from different forecasts of oil price or production. Most analysts believe the price will be in the USD 70-80 per barrel range for the Venezuelan basket in 2010 and many predict a slight decrease in production (see Ref A for post’s oil sector outlook). Instead, we believe this variation derives largely from different perspectives on unknowns relating to Venezuela’s unique economic and political environment that have an important bearing on the economy. Relevant questions include the extent and economic impact of the electricity crisis (which itself could impact oil production), how the January 11 devaluation and related changes in the foreign exchange system will play out, the efficiency and effectiveness of
CARACAS 00000069 002 OF 004
what is almost surely to be increased fiscal spending, the pace of President Chavez’s march toward socialism, and the potential for social and political volatility. The price of oil, of course, will continue to be a determining factor.
GBRV Economic Strategy for 2010: Devaluation and Increased Fiscal Spending
¶4. (C) Parliamentary elections scheduled for September are shaping up as the key political event for 2010. For this reason, local analysts have long expected increased fiscal spending to be a key part of the GBRV’s economic strategy. Thanks largely to the fall in oil prices and the associated fall in GBRV revenue, fiscal spending appears to have fallen in real terms in 2009 after increasing 111 percent in real terms from 2004 to 2008. PDVSA’s social spending also appears to have dropped significantly in 2009. (Note: These statements are based on GBRV budget figures [including additional credits] for 2009 and PDVSA’s June 2009 financial statement. Off-budget spending from quasifiscal funds plays an important role in GBRV spending but is impossible to measure. End note.)
¶5. (C) The January 11 devaluation, which will provide a massive revenue boost in bolivars to PDVSA and the GBRV, indicates the importance President Chavez places on increasing spending in 2010 as a means to stimulate the economy and fund his party’s election campaign. As respected local consultancy Sintesis Financiera put it, “Chavez’s decision [to devalue] reflects his judgment that the benefit of making significant amounts of money immediately available to the government to fund the 2010 campaign...outweighs the political cost of being blamed for inflation and recession.” Both Sintesis Financiera and Ecoanalitica estimated the devaluation will provide a net increase in fiscal revenue to the central government in 2010 of approximately Bs 80 billion (the equivalent of USD 30 or 18 billion, depending on which official exchange rate one uses). The GBRV and PDVSA have other mechanisms on which they can rely to close any remaining deficits, including domestic bond issuances for the GBRV and, thanks to a recent legal reform, Central Bank financing for both. In other words, the GBRV will have the resources to significantly ramp up spending in 2010.
¶6. (C) The devaluation and increased spending are not panaceas for restoring growth, however. We expect the GBRV to increase public sector salaries, to seek to revitalize existing or create new social programs targeted at Chavez’s political base, and to pour money into electoral campaigns. (Note: On January 15 Chavez announced minimum wage increases of 10 percent in March and 15 percent in September. End note.) The impact these measures will have on growth is a major question. As the experience of health program Barrio Adentro indicates (ref B), many social programs are in decline; on the other hand, a pollster recently told Emboffs his company’s data from November 2009 showed a slight uptick in the penetration and perceived effectiveness of social programs, which he attributed largely to a new program targeted at Caracas barrios (septel). While it provides the revenue for a fiscal stimulus, the devaluation will likely increase inflation (thereby putting downward pressure on purchasing power and real demand) and could dampen certain import-dependent economic activity. Confusion related to how the new two-tiered official exchange rate will work may also take a small toll on growth. As noted in ref C, we doubt the change in relative prices brought about by the devaluation will be sufficient to stimulate local production in any significant way.
Controlling Inflation: BCV Intervention and Coercion
CARACAS 00000069 003 OF 004
¶7. (C) The devaluation has caused some local analysts to raise their predictions for 2010 inflation from 30-35 percent to 35-50 percent. President Chavez and his government are clearly worried about the potential for increased inflation and seem to have three strategies for dealing with it. First, by offering a preferential rate for imports deemed essential, the GBRV is hoping to contain price increases in basic goods. Second, the Venezuelan Central Bank (BCV) has unveiled and begun to implement a long-anticipated strategy to manage the parallel foreign exchange rate (ref D), used by many importers when they cannot get access to one of the official exchange rates. Finally, President Chavez has threatened businesses that raise prices with expropriation, and the GBRV’s consumer protection agency has conducted a well-publicized campaign of “inspections” of businesses suspected of raising prices. Taken together, these measures may well keep inflation at the lower end of the 35-50 percent range, but they also introduce additional distortions, may lead to shortages in some cases, and do not create a more positive climate for investment.
Other Key Unknowns: Electricity Crisis and the March Toward Socialism
¶8. (C) The two-pronged electricity crisis Venezuela is currently experiencing is clearly having an impact on Venezuela’s economy. Problems resulting from years of underinvestment in transmission, distribution, and new generation capacity have been mounting over the past several years (ref E). On top of these problems, an El Nino-related drought in southeastern Venezuela has forced the GBRV to begin to reduce generation at the hydroelectric dams that supply Venezuela with 70 percent of its power. The GBRV has shut down production lines at energy intensive state-owned steel and aluminum producers and begun to ration electricity throughout the country. We have not seen a credible estimate of the likely impact of this crisis on real GDP, but it could be significant if rains come later or in lesser volume than normal. The electricity crisis is a symbol of the consequences of the GBRV’s economic model, which values spending with direct and immediate political impact over longer-term investment and institution building. We expect mounting infrastructure and services problems in other areas, particularly as state and municipal governments, which provide many services, have seen their budgets progressively cut in real terms.
¶9. (C) The pace of President Chavez’s march toward socialism will also have an impact on economic growth. State control over the economy is increasing, whether directly through nationalizations or indirectly through increased regulations or measures such as the devaluation (which gives public sector entities access to a preferential rate for imports and thus a further competitive advantage). Given institutional weaknesses and the priority put on political over economic results, increased state control has often translated into lower and/or more inefficient production, as the case of the basic industries in Guayana clearly shows (ref F). Over the past three years, the GBRV has nationalized important companies in the oil, oilfield services, electricity, telecommunications, cement, banking, food production and distribution, and steel sectors, among others. The mostly negative economic consequences of nationalizations across key sectors and other instances of state intervention will continue to play out in 2010, and if Chavez increases the pace of the transition toward socialism the economic impact could be even greater.
A Complex Feedback Loop: the Economy and the Social and Political Situation
CARACAS 00000069 004 OF 004
¶10. (C) Small-scale protests, often related to economic or infrastructure issues, are common throughout Venezuela. According to a political economist who has studied the 1989 “Caracazo”, a more generalized and violent social uprising whose proximate trigger was an increase in gasoline prices, current social, political, and economic conditions are such that more generalized protests are possible today, though he cautioned that there was no way to predict whether (or when and how) they might actually take place. A deepening of the electricity crisis and further contraction of the economy could further heighten underlying social tensions. President Chavez, for his part, is acutely aware of the impact the country’s general economic trajectory has had on his popularity. As evidenced by his decision to terminate an unpopular electricity rationing plan in Caracas and his appointment of Ali Rodriguez as electricity minister, he is obviously concerned about the potential political impact of the electricity crisis. If the electricity crisis deepens and increased spending does not stimulate the economy - or, specifically, reward his supporters - enough to compensate for the negative effects of the devaluation, President Chavez could face more serious political difficulties. Were the opposition more organized and united, he almost certainly would. CAULFIELD

Wikileaks : Viewing cable 10ZAGREB53, CROATIAN PROSECUTORS INVESTIGATING FORMER PM AND

31 Dicembre 2010


VZCZCXRO8278
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHVB #0053/01 0261340
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 261340Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9847
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

Tuesday, 26 January 2010, 13:40
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 000053
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/SCE, EUR/ACE, AND INL/AAE
EO 12958 DECL: 01/01/2020
TAGS PGOV, PREL, KCOR, HR
SUBJECT: CROATIAN PROSECUTORS INVESTIGATING FORMER PM AND
OTHER “UNTOUCHABLES” FOR CORRUPTION
REF: 09 ZAGREB 644
Classified By: Political Officer Chris Zimmer for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Chief State Prosecutor Mladen Bajic has outlined to us several ongoing corruption cases targeting former Prime Minister Ivo Sanader and other top government officials. Prosecutors are developing at least one case against the former PM which could result in his indictment, and they are continuing to uncover evidence in several other cases which could also implicate Sanader. PM Kosor has strengthened anti-corruption efforts by creating interagency teams to investigate the most serious cases of corruption in state-owned enterprises, while the Ministers of Interior and Justice have warned that there are no “untouchables” in the corruption clampdown. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (C) In a series of meetings in early to mid-January, Croatian Chief State Prosecutor Mladen Bajic described several ongoing corruption probes to Poloff which target former Prime Minister Ivo Sanader, current and former ministers, and nearly all major state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Bajic said that Sanader has possible involvement in several cases, but the one in which prosecutors have gathered the most evidence involves illegal mediation between his friends and Hypo Alpe Adria Bank Group of Austria. The Hypo Bank case indicates that Sanader allegedly arranged a DM 4 million loan for his neighbor, Miroslav Kutle, in the 1990’s and received a DM 800,000 kickback from Kutle in return. XXXXXXXXXXXX is cooperating with the anti-corruption prosecutors (USKOK), and XXXXXXXXXXXX story has been corroborated by XXXXXXXXXXXX with knowledge of the transactions. The illegal mediation charge for receiving gifts and benefits while abusing an official position to secure business transactions carries a prison term of one to five years. Bajic said that Hypo Bank is cooperating with the investigation.

¶3. (C) Sanader is also implicated in several corruption cases involving the Transportation Ministry. Transport Minister Bozidar Kalmeta has been under fire for several months due to corruption cases XXXXXXXXXXXX Bajic said that Sanader often bypassed Kalmeta and gave instructions about how to handle certain cases directly to . Bajic did note, however, that XXXXXXXXXXXX should have at least been aware of what was happening within XXXXXXXXXXXX.

¶4. (C) Bajic said his office is leading interagency teams established under orders from PM Kosor to deal with five priority cases involving state-owned enterprises (SOEs): XXXXXXXXXXXX. The teams, led by the prosecutor’s Office for Suppression of Corruption and Organized Crime (USKOK), meet daily and include the Police, Tax Administration, Finance Police, and other experts. Bajic said he believes that all major Croatian SOEs are now under investigation. Chief of Police Oliver Grbic told reporters in mid-January that police were running twelve investigations during the past six months intoXXXXXXXXXXXX management officials of public companies.

¶5. (C) A sixth company under investigation, Podravka, has 26 percent government ownership, and parliament approves the supervisory board. At least seven members of the board, all affiliated with the ruling coalition, were arrested, and Deputy Prime Minister (and Minister of Economy and former Podravka executive) Damir Polancec resigned in October 2009. Dinko Cvitan, head of USKOK, confirmed to poloff on January 21 that USKOK has now opened a formal investigation of Polancec for illegal mediation. The scandal involves embezzlement and fraudulent loans by several Podravka-linked firms in an attempt by managers to buy controlling interest in the company. Bajic said he needed several documents from XXXXXXXXXXXX in Hungary to move forward with charges in the case, and initially described efforts to secure them from Hungary as “catastrophic.” XXXXXXXXXXXX and several Hungarian officials were uncooperative, he said, XXXXXXXXXXXX. During a January 18 meeting between PM Kosor and Hungarian PM Bajnai, PM Bajnai told press that documents relating to Podravka’s XXXXXXXXXXXX were sent on to Croatia on January 15; Bajic said he received a Hungarian prosecutor’s
ZAGREB 00000053 002 OF 002
report on XXXXXXXXXXXX’s dealings with Podravka on January 22.

¶6. (U) Minister of Interior Tomislav Karamarko and Minister of Justice Ivan Simonovic have also been spearheading a public relations campaign to publicize the “war on corruption” in Croatia. Simonovic said on Croatian Radio that “no one can be above the law -- either former or present or future presidents or prime ministers.” He went on to add that “there have always been untouchables, but this is the first time in the history of Croatia that there won’t be untouchables anymore.”

¶7. (C) COMMENT: An important test of Croatia’s anti-corruption efforts will be the ability to go after the biggest fish. For several years, Bajic has been extremely hesitant to open even a formal investigation, let alone seek an indictment against high-ranking officials, unless he felt he had a watertight case. The opening of the formal investigation against Polancec, and Bajic’s assessment that the Hypo Bank case currently has solid evidence against Sanader, are strong signs that some “big fish” may soon face formal charges, joining former Defense and Interior Minister Berislav Roncevic, who is currently under indictment for a truck procurement scandal during his time at the MoD (reftel). While the illegal mediation charges being considered against Sanader and Polancec may seem rather minor, Bajic suggests that there is likely much more to be uncovered involving the former PM. In any case, as Bajic likes to point out, Al Capone was brought down for tax evasion rather than for his more notorious activities. FOLEY

Wikileaks : Viewing cable 10PRISTINA44, KOSOVO: SUCCESS IN THE NORTH KEY TO A SUCCESSFUL

31 Dicembre 2010

VZCZCXRO9597
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHPS #0044/01 0271544
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 271544Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY PRISTINA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9652
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEOBZB/12SWS THULE AB GL PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1330
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1868
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHFMISS/AFSOUTH NAPLES IT PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR TF FALCON PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEPGEA/CDR650THMIGP SHAPE BE PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUZEJAA/USNIC PRISTINA SR PRIORITY

Wednesday, 27 January 2010, 15:44
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRISTINA 000044
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR (SCE, ACE, RPM)
EO 12958 DECL: 01/27/2020
TAGS PGOV, PINR, PREL, MARR, KV
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: SUCCESS IN THE NORTH KEY TO A SUCCESSFUL
KFOR DRAWDOWN
REF: A. 09 PRISTINA 509 B. 09 USNATO 409 C. BELGRADE 0003
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHRISTOPHER DELL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: While skirmishes and security incidents may be rare from day to day, an impending frozen conflict in Northern Kosovo remains the greatest threat to a safe and secure environment (SASE) in Kosovo in the near and medium terms. Fortunately, a constellation of factors exists that could reverse ten years of rot in Northern Kosovo and avoid letting this region become a frozen conflict. An impressive level of international consensus exists to address Northern Kosovo issues, and international actors and the GOK have agreed on a Northern Strategy to do just that. KFOR, at its current robust “Gate 1” force posture of 10,000, can play an important role, deterring extremists both north and south, as this strategy is implemented. As decisions are made on progress to “Gate 2” (5,000 troops) and beyond, the best way to operationalize the NAC’s central condition for successful drawdown -- maintenance of a safe and secure environment, with a threat level assessed as low -- will be success in this Northern Strategy. Benchmarks for this success include replacement of illegal parallel structures with legitimate Kosovo bodies, the establishment of robust rule of law institutions, the re-establishment of customs controls and revenue collection, and the re-establishment of legal, normalized electrical services and billing under KEK control. END SUMMARY
NORTHERN KOSOVO REMAINS THE BIGGEST THREAT TO SASE
--------------------------------------------- -----
¶2. (C) We have argued (ref A) that to achieve the conditions-based drawdown of KFOR troops agreed by the North Atlantic Council (ref B), it is crucial both to build local security capacity and address existing security threats now, while KFOR’s force posture remains robust. Northern Kosovo -- home base for illegal Serbian parallel structures and a region rife with smuggling and organized crime -- remains perhaps the greatest threat facing Kosovo in the short and medium terms. Kosovo institutions have exercised little control there since 1999, and practically none since riots after Kosovo’s independence in 2008. The result has been a zone where customs collection is essentially on an “honor system,” courts don’t function, international police all but fear to tread, and the only municipal governments are those elected by the Republic of Serbia in polls held in direct contravention of UNSCR 1244. Lack of activity or even access by Kosovo authorities in Northern Kosovo is a constant irritant for Kosovo’s leaders and the country’s majority Albanian population, and it represents for both the very real threat of the partition of Kosovo -- a reversal of ten years of USG policy and a grave threat to stability in Kosovo and the Western Balkan region. A series of recent statements by Belgrade’s leadership has established that the ultimate partition of Kosovo is, at a minimum, one of the policy options Belgrade has in view (ref C).
NORTHERN STRATEGY AN OPPORTUNITY
--------------------------------
PRISTINA 00000044 002 OF 004
¶3. (C) For much of the past ten years, pursuit of our strategic goal of a stable, democratic, multi- ethnic Kosovo has taken a back seat in the North to tactical concerns of avoiding demonstrations and clashes. Fortunately, there is a growing consensus in the international community that the time is now to reverse this trend. Embassies of the major European powers, the U.S., the International Civilian Office and the European Union Rule of Law Mission EULEX have agreed on a Northern Strategy to displace the illegal parallel structures, introduce legitimate, legal GOK structures, and increase the presence and improve the performance of rule of law institutions (customs, police and courts) in Northern Kosovo. The GOK has accepted this strategy as its own, and has pledged budget resources toward its implementation.
¶4. (C) That this international and local alliance for action in Northern Kosovo comes while KFOR remains at a robust presence of roughly 10,000 troops is fortunate. The Northern Strategy (septel) has been designed to incentivize participation in GOK structures, not to impose them by force. That said, local forces, including Serbs and Albanians who benefit from the current near lawless environment, could attempt to use violence to disrupt attempts to collect customs duties or reopen courts. KFOR at 10,000 will play an important, if ancillary, role in this strategy to ensure Kosovo’s long-term stability and territorial integrity. At 10,000, KFOR remains capable to respond to multiple, simultaneous incidents. KFOR’s ability to respond with overwhelming force to multiple provocations will itself serve as a valuable deterrent. As recently as January 26, Serbian State Secretary for the Ministry of Kosovo and Metohija Oliver Ivanovic raised the specter of violence, arguing it is the inevitable outcome of the Northern Strategy. Whether meant as a warning, or simply to rattle the less committed elements of the International Community, Ivanovic’s statement was a useful reminder that some Serb elements consider such threats and tactics as legitimate. A strong KFOR is the best deterrent to extremists on either side of the River Ibar.
ACHIEVEMENTS IN THE NORTH ARE PRACTICAL SASE BENCHMARKS
--------------------------------------------- ----------
¶5. (SBU) While a robust KFOR is important to the success of the Northern Strategy, the implementation of the strategy is an opportunity for KFOR, a roadmap to a successful drawdown to deterrent presence. In our view, the central condition established by the North Atlantic Council for KFOR’s eventual drawdown to deterrent presence is “maintenance of a safe and secure environment (SASE), with a threat level assessed as low.” In the past, we have been all too quick to assess the durability of Kosovo’s threat level based on the presence or absence of security incidents on a daily basis. Depending on a definition of SASE as the absence of security incidents risks masking a disturbing reality -- Northern Kosovo can be, at the same time, both free of security incidents and a frozen conflict in the making, at risk of partition. A Northern Kosovo like this, as it is today, is a far cry from stability, and is in fact an engine for future instability in Kosovo and the wider Western Balkan region.
PRISTINA 00000044 003 OF 004
¶6. (SBU) As the NAC debates the move to “Gate 2” (5,000 troops) and beyond, we would argue that the time is ripe to move from a negative operationalization of security, based on the absence of incidents, to a positive one. Such an operationalization would establish realistic, observable measures of success in reversing a decade of erosion in Northern Kosovo and establishing Kosovo’s authority throughout its territory. Such benchmarks should include:
-- successful establishment of the decentralized municipality of North Mitrovica;
-- re-establishment of collection of customs revenue at Gates 1 and 31, as part of a single, Kosovo-wide customs regime;
-- the staffing of the Mitrovica District Court with ethnic Serb and Albanian judges recognized by the Kosovo justice system;
-- enhanced EULEX police presence in Northern Kosovo, and the full integration of Kosovo Serb members of the Kosovo Police (KP) in Kosovo Police structures;
-- the replacement of illegal parallel municipal authorities in Northern Kosovo with, legal, legitimately constituted Kosovo bodies;
-- the arrest and prosecution of major organized crime figures; and,
-- the normalization of electric power distribution and billing throughout Northern Kosovo by KEK, according to UNMIK law and regulation.
STATUS NEUTRAL, NOT VALUE NEUTRAL
---------------------------------
¶7. (C) Some may protest that the establishment of such benchmarks represents a break with KFOR’s status neutral stance. This is patently untrue. In no case do the benchmarks listed above violate UNSCR 1244, the source of KFOR’s mandate, and in most cases -- like electricity and local self- government -- success in these benchmarks would represent a re-establishment of the UNSCR 1244 regime, respect of UNMIK laws and UNMIK regulations. In the end, this is true status neutrality. What some would request, only taking positions and actions which are equally acceptable to Belgrade and Pristina, isn’t status neutrality, but rather value neutrality. This is neither in KFOR’s interest nor in Kosovo’s, and was never USG policy in the region.
COMMENT
-------
¶8. (C) For ten years, stability in Northern Kosovo has been defined as merely the lack of conflict. Today’s KFOR, at “Gate 1” levels of 10,000 troops, presents our best opportunity to define stability properly, as success in addressing Kosovo’s most vexing security threat: Northern Kosovo as an emerging frozen conflict. Success in the Northern Strategy -- including reintroducing Kosovo structures to this region, and eliminating illegal Serbian parallel structures -- represents our best chance for a peaceful, stable Kosovo governing within the
PRISTINA 00000044 004 OF 004
full extent of its recognized borders, and KFOR’s surest roadmap to a successful reduction in troop strength to “Gate 2” and beyond. DELL

Oriano Mattei : Come annunciato, il Brasile ci tratta come fossimo uno stato totalitario e dice no all’estradizione di Cesare Battisti

31 Dicembre 2010


Come annunciato, il Brasile ci tratta come fossimo uno stato totalitario e dice no all’estradizione di Cesare Battisti - il ministro degli esteri amorim fa pure l’offeso: NESSUN AFFRONTO. GOVERNO ITALIANO "impertinente" - ’gnazio larissa incazzato NERO:"la peggiore previsione si è realizzata. una decisione ingiusta e gravemente offensiva"

Da Repubblica.it

Il Brasile non concederà l'estradizione di Cesare Battisti. E' il ministro degli Esteri Celso Amorim a rendere noto che il presidente Lula ha deciso di non consegnare all'Italia l'ex terrorista, detenuto in Brasile dal 2007, condannato in Italia all'ergastolo per 4 omicidi commessi quando negli anni '70 era leader dei Proletari Armati per il Comunismo (Pac), nonostante le richieste del governo italiano. Una presa di posizione destinata ad accendere forti polemiche, che il presidente Luiz Inacio Lula Da Silva ha atteso l'ultimo giorno del suo mandato per comunicare.

Ad alzare ulteriormente i toni arriva la nota ufficiale letta dal ministro Amorim, secondo cui il governo brasiliano considera "impertinente in particolare nel riferimento personale a Lula" la nota diffusa ieri dal Governo italiano 1 circa il caso Battisti.

Si attendeva che Lula comunicasse direttamente con il presidente del Consiglio Silvio Berlusconi o chiamasse il Quirinale, invece Amorim ha detto di non ritenere che il presidente Lula si metterà in contatto con le autorità italiane. Ha anche affermato di non credere che le decisioni di Brasilia su Battisti possano pregiudicare i rapporti con l'Italia.

In più Brasilia si dice "stupita" della reazione italiana. Sempre secondo la nota del governo brasiliano, pubblicata sull'edizione online del Globo,
la decisione di Lula non rappresenta un affronto verso un altro Paese "nel momento in cui si creano situazioni particolari che possono generare rischi per la persona, nonostante il carattere democratico dei due Stati".

Si tratta di una "decisione sovrana sulla base del trattato", del 1989 tra Italia e Brasile, sostiene il capo della diplomazia brasiliana, che non vede alcuna ragione di "preoccuparsi di eventuali ripercussioni nelle relazioni con l'Italia". Proprio per questo motivo, dice, Lula non è neanche tenuto a comunicare alle autorità italiane l'esito delle sua scelta che sarà notificata attraverso i normali canali diplomatici.

Immediata la reazione del ministro Ignazio La Russa: "La peggiore previsione si è realizzata", ma l'Italia "non lascerà nulla di intentato" affinchè il Brasile "receda da questa decisione ingiusta e gravemente offensiva", dice il ministro della Difesa.

Oriano Mattei : PER LA STAMPA BRASILIANA L’EVENTUALE “NIET” DI LULA ALL’ESTRADIZIONE DI BATTISTI NON CHIUDE IL CASO

31 Dicembre 2010

PER LA STAMPA BRASILIANA L’EVENTUALE “NIET” DI LULA ALL’ESTRADIZIONE DI BATTISTI NON CHIUDE IL CASO - L’EX TERRORISTA DOVRà COMUNQUE RESTARE IN CARCERE FINO A FEBBRAIO, E IL CASO DOVRà TORNARE ALL’ALTA CORTE - LA PATATA BOLLENTE FINIREBBE QUINDI NELLE MANI DELLA NEOELETTA DILMA ROUSSEFF - OGGI NUOVA RIUNIONE TRA LULA E L’AVVOCATURA STATO - VIAGGIO NELLA PRIGIONE DI PAPUDA, DOVE CESARINO ATTENDE LA LIETA NOVELLA…

1 - CARCERE FINO A FEBBRAIO, CASO ANCORA A STF...
(ANSA) - La probabile decisione, attesa oggi, del presidente uscente Lula di respingere l'estradizione di Cesare Battisti richiesta dall'Italia non chiuderà il caso dell'ex terrorista rosso, che anzi è destinato ad andare avanti anche nelle prossime settimane. Lo afferma oggi la stampa brasiliana, rilevando che Battisti dovrà comunque rimanere in carcere fino a febbraio. Lula ha in programma incontrare oggi a Brasilia Luis Inacio Lucena Adams, presidente dell'Avvocatura generale dello Stato, che ieri - in un rapporto consegnato allo stesso Lula - si è espresso contro l'estradizione.
Il 'dossier Battisti', sottolinea la stampa locale, dovrà comunque tornare, per una nuova analisi del caso, nel Supremo Tribunal Federal (Stf) del Brasile, ha sottolineato il presidente dell'Alta Corte, Cezar Peluso, in dichiarazioni ad un giornale locale. Tale nuova valutazione potrà avvenire solo a febbraio, quando l'Stf riprenderà le attività dopo la pausa estiva in Brasile, ha detto Peluso al Folha de S.Paulo, secondo il quale il relatore del caso nella nuova analisi dell'Alta Corte sarà Gilmar Mendes, ex presidente dell'Stf che un anno fa, quando il caso Battisti venne esaminato dal tribunale, votò a favore dell'estradizione.

2 - IN CELLA A PAPUDA: RADIO, FRUTTA E POSTA DALL'ITALIA. LA VITA DIETRO LE SBARRE DEL SUPERCARCERE
Paolo Manzo per "La Stampa"

Il caldo non dà tregua nella pianura arida e desolata dove sorge il complesso penitenziario di Papuda, a una ventina di chilometri da Brasilia. Se non fosse per la garitta di sorveglianza, dove un paio di sudati poliziotti brasiliani impugnano fucili enormi, potremmo credere di essere in una steppa desertica. Il carcere di Papuda fu inaugurato il 16 gennaio del 1979, quando in Brasile c'era ancora la dittatura militare al potere e l'Italia democratica era sconvolta dagli anni di piombo (un mese dopo di quello stesso anno, i Pac di Battisti avrebbero sparato al gioielliere milanese Pierluigi Torregiani).
Dal maggio del 2007 l'ex terrorista-scrittore è rinchiuso qui dentro, qui ogni mattina si sveglia e ogni sera va a dormire. Una routine obbligata da quando, due mesi prima, era stato catturato dall'Interpol su una spiaggia di Copacabana. E adesso, nonostante la decisione dell'ormai quasi ex presidente brasiliano Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, non è assolutamente detto che esca in tempo per festeggiare da uomo libero l'inizio del 2011.
«L'attesa lo sta consumando, Cesare è un uomo stanco», spiegava all' inizio del 2009 Fred Vargas, la giallista francese che da anni appoggia l'ex terrorista dei Pac anche economicamente nelle spese processuali. Se era stanco allora, oggi sicuramente lo è di più, anche perché la depressione si è fatta più volte sentire. «Sono seguito dal punto di vista psichiatrico», raccontava recentemente al settimanale brasiliano Istoé, «ogni giorno prendo una pastiglia di Zoloft», un antidepressivo. Nei momenti più duri si tira su rileggendo le tante lettere di solidarietà che gli arrivano, a migliaia, da tutto il mondo. Anche dall'Italia.
Sdraiato sul suo lettino nel carcere, Battisti è comunque fortunato. Non si accorge del sovraffollamento disumano delle altre celle. Lui vive in una stanza che condivide solo con un altro detenuto, un austriaco finito dentro per frode fiscale, un tipo «tranquillo», il che gli consente di scrivere, rigorosamente a mano. Mangia poco Battisti, preferisce la frutta, soprattutto le pere, e beve tanta acqua. Fa caldo a Papuda e la cosa peggiore che possa accadere è la disidratazione, come nel novembre del 2009 quando l'ex terrorista cominciò uno sciopero della fame per dare un'accelerata al suo caso. Si fermò dopo dieci giorni, per espressa richiesta di Lula. Veste leggero Battisti, jeans e camiciole possibilmente di colore chiaro, e ascolta la radio in cella per tenersi informato sulle decisioni giuridico-politiche che lo riguardano. Per l'ultima udienza del Supremo Tribunal Federal, quella del 18 novembre 2009 che concesse l'estradizione lasciando però l'ultima parola a Lula, è riuscito persino ad ottenere un permesso per seguirla in tv nella sala comune del carcere. Un permesso concesso dal direttore di Papuda che, anche se non lo ammetterà mai, non lo ama particolarmente perché gli hanno detto che in Italia lo hanno condannato anche perché il 6 giugno del 1978 fu lui a sparare ad un suo collega italiano, il maresciallo della nostra polizia penitenziaria Antonio Santoro.
Oltre alla scrittura, la depressione se ne va quando a trovarlo in carcere arrivano delegazioni di parlamentari ed amici per esprimergli solidarietà. L'ultima volta è successo il 18 dicembre scorso, quando un comitato verde-oro che lo appoggia ha fatto entrare a Papuda una torta per festeggiare il 56˚ compleanno di Battisti. O quando arriva, come lo scorso 24 novembre, Joice Lima, una 25enne mulatta esuberante con cui è fidanzato da prima dell'arresto, quando era libero a Copacabana. Quando uscirà dal carcere, tuttavia, Cesare ha già detto ai suoi avvocati che non tornerà a Rio, di cui ha «un ricordo tragico», ma andrà a San Paolo. L'ipotesi di essere estradato in Italia non la considera nemmeno. «Piuttosto mi uccido», ha ripetuto più volte.