mercoledì 26 gennaio 2011
Wikileaks : Viewing cable 08STATE99666, CRITICAL EQUIPMENT NEEDS FOR IRAN,S NEW IR-2 CENTRIFUGE DESIGN
26 Gennaio 2011
P 172128Z SEP 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY
UNCLAS STATE 099666
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KNNP TRGY PREL PARM IR MNUC AORC IAEA UNSC UK GM FR
SUBJECT: CRITICAL EQUIPMENT NEEDS FOR IRAN,S NEW IR-2 CENTRIFUGE DESIGN
REF: A. STATE 021770B. STATE 039585C. STATE 052030
¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 3.
¶2. (SBU) BACKGROUND: Washington provided all Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Participating Government (PGs) with detailed information regarding the critical commodities Iran will require to support the deployment of the next generation of gas centrifuges for its uranium enrichment program in ref C. Washington subsequently identified a list of those technologies which Iran cannot indigenously manufacture, and would need to procure from foreign suppliers. We would like to provide information about key suppliers resident in certain European PGs. The U.S. is making a similar approach to host governments in Asia, as well as key transshipment countries. The U.S. intends to approach governments with any new developments in the U.S.,s efforts to prevent Iranian procurement of critical commodities.
¶3. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Posts are requested to approach appropriate host government officials to deliver the nonpaper in para 4. In doing so, posts should pursue the following objectives:
-- Share information on ongoing USG efforts to prevent Iranian procurement of key gas centrifuge-related commodities and provide additional information to specific NSG PGs to make them aware of companies that are major suppliers of such items in their country.
-- Encourage host governments, if they have not already done so, to discuss and highlight to businesses and law enforcement authorities the importance of vigilance against the deceptive procurement practices of Iran particularly relating to items useful in a gas centrifuge program.
-- Urge host governments to share any relevant information from their industry outreach activities with the USG, the NSG, and the IAEA.
¶4. (U) Begin U.S. non-paper
FOR ALL POSTS
-- Industry outreach is critical to ensuring that Iran cannot procure items to advance its WMD programs, including its uranium enrichment activities.
-- Even though the U.S. has enacted comprehensive economic sanctions against the Iranian government, the U.S. government is undertaking various initiatives to raise awareness among U.S. industry to avoid illicit diversion of their products, and prevent the unwitting transfer of items to Iran that may contribute to Iran,s nuclear, ballistic missile, and advanced conventional weapons programs.
-- For example, the U.S. alerts U.S. companies that Iran uses deceptive tactics to make its procurement efforts for its nuclear, ballistic missile, and advanced conventional weapons programs appear to be legitimate commercial activities. Iranian entities also form front companies in other countries for the sole purpose of sending dual-use items to Iran for use in these programs. These front companies enable the regime to obtain materials that the country of origin would typically prohibit for export to Iran.
-- Therefore, we are asking U.S. companies to be extremely vigilant about their overseas customers, especially customers operating in known transshipment countries and countries with weak or nonexistent export controls.
-- The U.S. government is currently reaching out to U.S. manufacturers of critical commodities that Iran needs to procure from foreign suppliers for its new gas centrifuge design and alerting these companies to be cautious of unknown customers that may be procuring items on behalf of Iran,s illicit programs.
-- The U.S. government is also considering additional ways to alert industry and will keep your government informed of new developments in our industry outreach initiatives.
-- If you have not already done so, we encourage you to conduct outreach to your industry to raise awareness regarding the requirements of your export controls for Iran. We also request that you alert companies about Iran,s deceptive procurement practices.
-- Targeted outreach to companies known to produce these critical commodities can sensitize manufacturers and exporters to Iran,s deceptive procurement tactics and make them aware of export control regulations which ) consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1803, 1747, and 1737 - prohibit exporting sensitive commodities that could advance proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities in Iran, such as uranium enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing, heavy water production and/or reactor operation.
-- We ask that your government share any relevant information, such as inquiries your companies receive from Iranian entities, with the USG, the NSG, and the IAEA as this information could aid ongoing efforts to track Iranian procurement attempts and provide additional insight on Iranian procurement practices.
-- We are seeking ways to present information to broad groups of likely suppliers, re-exporters or transshipers on the critical commodities Iran is seeking from foreign suppliers for its nuclear and missile programs. We would like to hear your government,s suggestions on how to best accomplish this and are open to further discussions at the expert level.
-- The following companies are major producers of critical commodities that Iran needs to procure from foreign suppliers for the new gas centrifuge design.
-- We also request that your government encourage companies to be cautious about requests to transfer these critical commodities within the EU, as Iran may seek to exploit the EU countries with weaker export control enforcement mechanisms and limited knowledge of the sensitivity of these items.